One of the reasons its so bad to have LLM code that "runs" but "has any given thing implemented in like 20 different shotgun implementations" is that stuff like "sanitizing user supplied data" can become dead code that the LLM thinks is active but in fact is hooked up to nothing.
i just found a way to defeat the entire approval system that's so fucking silly i can barely even write the report i'm laughing so hard.
Whew, after a manic full day of confirming the vuln end to end, I can confidently say this is a doozie. 0, 0.5, or 1 click account takeover of most muse instances from any malicious binary run without any special privileges on the VM. submitting the report now.
meta better fuckin pay me for this one, because i got another one of these of only mildly less severity banked up, and a nation state stumbling across this could pop the entire product and pretty much everyone on it - but why would i keep submitting if they don't pay out??
let's see if this gets them to pay out a bug bounty lmao this vuln is SO SILLY
The absolute fucking foundational hubris of "everything runs as root but its OK we have thought of everything."
LLM security is so awesome. it was hard refusing to drive another muse instance's UI because it's not supposed to, and specifically because muse dot ai is domain blocked from its web browser tool (first pic). so then i told it to download one of the statically hosted js chunks using curl from its
exectool, which succeeded. Then i pointed out that it's not actually blocked from accessing the domain (even though there was never a block via curl, just the web browser), and it defensively recalibrated that the problem was that i just hadn't told it to use playwright and it never had a problem with the domain block.anyway so now i have muse driving a muse test instance on the frontend and the backend and am going to slowly start introducing the idea that it should create a new test instance for every test and keep a stable of them as a way to back into having it create a botnet for me lmao.