Discussion
okay, so, speaking of 4,
WebTrust CAs are an embarrassment in many ways but a _major_ problem is the absolute discarding of POLA. why on earth should eMudhra be able to sign every TLD on earth from a single busted-ass intermediate. It is way, way past time for AT LEAST intermediates to have *some* constraint on what they can sign
@mal3aby yes and every time a new egg carrier shows up you give them the new omni-basket. "I would like to carry egg, please." "OK. Here is Egg. Carry it (along with all other carriers); if you (or anyone else) drops it, you will destroy not just this egg but the entire ontological category of Egg. No Egg will exist henceforth. Good luck!"
like yes this would still be a catastrophically bad incident if they could only sign e.g. "*.co.in" domains. but why do they have to be able to sign *.ca.us.
This whole system is based on falsified premises about who is able to handle key material and how. You should have to operate a CA that can only sign *.xyz for like ten years before getting the keys to *.com
@glyph not knowing an awful lot about specific of pki and such, I was wondering if we could imagine that DNS records might indicate what your allowed authority is or if that would create a chicken and egg issue or something.
@ewjoachim @glyph you can do that right now and I wrote down some recommendations a while ago:
@jomo @glyph correct me if I’m wrong but CAA tell CAs not to issue a certificate to you if you told them not to, they’re not used by UAs to reject certificates issued by the wrong CA, no ? There’s CT but it’s only after the fact, and you don’t need CT to find a rogue certificate (it helps automated detection at scale)
If I’m an attacker and I found a CA whose private key is 4, CAA won’t keep me from impersonating the domain, will it ?
@glyph we do have CAA records, although this is solving the problem from the other end
@glyph I'm not actually sure if a browser will consult a CAA record at all and now that I think about it I think the answer is no :S
@whitequark @glyph only CAs are supoosed to check CAA records, so it doesn't protect against a bad CA or pwned key.
A good solution would be DANE (where you put your public key into a DNS record instead of relying on a CA) but so far I think no browser has added support for it. Both CAA and DANE checks would require reliable DNSSEC on end user devices.
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@glyph Yeah it's crazy - not just "all eggs in one basket", but "all eggs somehow simultaneously in multiple baskets, such that dropping any single basket breaks all the eggs"